Later that evening, the black female in the blue floppy hat returned alone to the North Crittenden residence. As she approached Stokes, he walked off of the porch to meet her. Stokes and the woman met in the area between North Crittenden and North Crittenden and walked to the back in between both residences.
Stokes and the woman were out of Detective Stout's view for approximately twenty-nine seconds before they reappeared. When they came back into the view of Detective Stout, he observed the woman lift her T-shirt and put something inside of her bra. Stokes then returned to the porch at North Crittenden, while the woman drove away.
Detective Stout notified other IPD officers regarding his observations. Following a traffic stop of the car driven by the woman, Indianapolis Police Department Detective Kincaid Detective Kincaid retrieved crack cocaine from inside the woman's bra.
Shortly thereafter, Stokes walked off the porch of North Crittenden and met with two men in the area between and North Crittenden. The men walked from the other half of the double house where Detective Stout was videotaping the transactions, which was across the street from North Crittenden.
See footnote Stokes and one of the men walked to the rear of North Crittenden where Detective Stout observed Stokes reach up to the windowsill by the side door and retrieve a white object smaller than a tennis ball. See footnote Stokes then went directly to the side door of North Crittenden, opened the door, and entered the residence together with the other black male. Stokes and the man were inside the residence for approximately one minute and twenty-nine seconds before Detective Stout observed them leave the residence.
The man had his left hand in his pocket and Stokes had his right hand cupped as if he was holding something inside of his hand. Stokes then returned to the porch at North Crittenden while both of the men returned to the other half of the double where Detective Stout was located.
As the IPD officers approached the residence, Riggs immediately stood up and quickly walked into the residence of North Crittenden. The IPD officers were given permission to enter the house and did so to apprehend Riggs. As the police searched for Riggs inside of the residence, they found the toilet running in the bathroom. The police found Riggs in the back bedroom. Riggs gave the police a false name when questioned.
The IPD officers searched around the porch at North Crittenden and in between the residences but did not find anything. The IPD officers then entered the side door of the vacant residence at North Crittenden and briefly searched inside the residence.
The IPD officers observed a large number of plastic baggies inside the residence, and eventually located a large plastic bag containing crack cocaine on the windowsill by the side door inside of the residence.
The substance was seized and subsequently tested. Laboratory tests showed that it was On August 16, , the State filed an information against Stokes charging him with Count I, conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, I. On October 28 - 29, , a jury trial was held.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Stokes guilty of all Counts. On November 26, , a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court further sentenced Stokes to thirty-five years executed and five years suspended on Count I, conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, a Class C felony. Stokes now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Jury's Review of Exhibits After Deliberation Began First, Stokes argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the jury to view the videotape surveillance of the and North Crittenden residences in the deliberation room and not in open court with the trial court's supervision. See footnote Stokes further argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view the videotape but not allowing the jury to view the cocaine that was recovered from the North Crittenden residence.
Conversely, the State argues that the trial court properly responded to the jury's requests during deliberations. In particular, the State contends that the videotape was material to the jury's deliberation and it was not unduly prejudicial because the jury previously viewed the videotape during trial. As a result, the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury's to view the videotape after deliberations began. The State further claims that it was within the trial court's discretion to not allow the jury to view the crack cocaine that was recovered by the IPD officers.
The correct procedure for answering questions raised by the jury after deliberations have begun is set forth in Indiana Code section , which states, in pertinent part: If, after the jury retires for deliberation:. Here, the parties agree that this statute does not apply because the jury did not express a disagreement over any item of testimony.
Thus, since the mandatory language of Indiana Code section does not apply in this case, the decision to allow the jury to view the videotape again is within the discretion of the trial court.
See Sturma v. State, N. The trial court should consider three factors in deciding whether to permit the jury to take a copy of the exhibits to the jury room. Thacker v. Those factors are: 1 whether the material will aid the jury in a proper consideration of the case; 2 whether any party will be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and 3 whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.
Indiana Michigan Power Company, N. Additionally, [t]he trial judge must conduct the proceedings in a manner that facilitates ascertainment of the truth, insures fairness, and obtains economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of both society and the criminal defendant.
Although this Court has been liberal in allowing the jury to rehear portions of the evidence, there are limitations on the trial court's discretion. For example, trial courts may not allow the jury to review the testimony of an entire trial.
While the trial court has discretion in determining what the jury may take with it to the jury room at the beginning of deliberations, that discretion is somewhat more limited in the situation where the jury interrupts its deliberations to request material to review. In the present case, the trial court did not give the jury the videotape at the beginning of deliberations, but allowed them to view it in the jury room after deliberations had commenced.
It is clear that the trial court could have given the jury the videotape at the beginning of deliberations. See Harris, N. It is also clear that the trial court could have given the jury the videotape during deliberations and allowed them to view the videotape in open court. See Sturma, N. However, we are presented with a slightly different situation when the evidence is not given to the jury in open court where the trial court can monitor the use of the videotape. In Lawson v. However, the court in Powell specifically noted that its holding was limited to cases in which additional materials were provided to the jury following the onset of deliberation.
Lawson, N. Here, we have a situation where additional materials were provided to the jury following the onset of deliberation. However, the court did not monitor the use of the videotape by playing it for the jury in open court, as suggested by Indiana Code section , Lawson, and Powell.
Rather, the trial court gave the videotape to the jury and provided the jury with the equipment and instructions to view the videotape on its own. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to review the videotape in the deliberation room without monitoring its use.
Nevertheless, we find that this error was harmless. In particular, Stokes fails to demonstrate how or why the review of the videotape at issue unduly prejudiced his case or was subject to improper use by the jury. See Goodrich, N. Our review of the evidence indicates that the videotape surveillance served to aid the jury in its consideration of the case.
See Thacker, N. Specifically, we believe that the videotape could aid the jury in determining the credibility of the testimony of the IPD officers regarding what occurred and in understanding to what extent, if any, Stokes participated in the illegal activity.
Further, there was little risk that the jury would issue or give undue weight to this exhibit because the videotape was already played in open court.
In fact, the record reveals that the jury viewed the videotape twice in court during the presentation of the evidence. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sending the videotape to the jury to view on their own after the jury began its deliberations.
Stokes further contends that the trial court erred in not allowing the jury to view the cocaine that was recovered from the windowsill at the North Crittenden residence. However, as mentioned above, the trial court has discretion in determining what evidence to allow the jury to view after deliberations have begun. Although Stokes contends that the jury could have placed undue emphasis on the other exhibits that the trial court allowed the jury to review, we find this contention without merit.
The record clearly shows that the jury was allowed to review photographs of the recovered cocaine. This photograph of the cocaine was admitted as an exhibit at trial and was sent to the jury with the other exhibits requested.
As a result, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the jury's request to view the cocaine. See id. Sufficiency of the Evidence Next, Stokes contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to establish that he committed dealing in cocaine and conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine. Standard of Review Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled.
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Cox v. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict, together with all reasonable and logical inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Alspach v.
The conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Cox, N. A verdict may be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt.
Maul v. Dealing in Cocaine Stokes contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for dealing in cocaine. Specifically, Stokes argues that the State failed to establish that he possessed the cocaine and had the requisite intent to deliver the cocaine that was recovered by the IPD officers. Indiana Code section , states, in pertinent part: A person who:.
A manufacture; B finance the manufacture of; C deliver; or D finance the delivery of;. Thus, in order to convict Stokes of dealing in cocaine, the State was required to prove that Stokes knowingly possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver the cocaine. See I. First, Stokes alleges that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed cocaine, as required for a conviction on charges of dealing in cocaine under Indiana Code section 2.
Stokes claims that the State merely proved the presence of cocaine in the North Crittenden residence. Stokes is correct that the State did not offer direct evidence that he had sold or was planning to sell the cocaine, but circumstantial evidence of possession with intent to deliver is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon appellate review, such evidence does not have to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence but need only generate a reasonable inference of guilt.
Mills v. In , at the age of 35 years old, Gerald was alive when on June 25th, the Korean War began when North Korean Communist forces crossed the 38th parallel. In , at the age of 57 years old, Gerald was alive when on September 5th, the Palestinian terrorist group Black September, with the assistance of German neo-nazis, kidnapped and killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich.
The attackers crept into the Olympic Village and abducted the athletes while they were sleeping. A German policeman was also killed. Chapman was found guilty of murder and still remains in jail. This page dedicated to Gerald R Stokes is a collaborative biography where anyone can add information and share memories.
Click the next to a field to edit any of the foundational information. To share personal memories and photos select either Story or Photo. Only you can edit stories and photos. Have a question or searching for answers? Try leaving a comment asking the community for help. For additional details see about Collaborative Biographies. Sign In. People Photos Mission Share Memory. Last Known Residence. Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana Summary this page with more detailed information to improve the accuracy.
Gerald R Stokes was born on February 25, He died on July 4, at 84 years of age. Gerald R Stokes Gerald Stokes - Find records of Gerald Stokes. Every life has a story to tell. This collaborative biography is dedicated to tell the story of Gerald R Stokes. Click the to update this introduction with a synopsis or highlights of Gerald's life. Update bio graphy. What's this? Gerald's biography. Gerald R Stokes Most commonly known as. Gerald R Stokes Full name.
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